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LEGAL MALPRACTICE-Membership in a Professional
Corporation Does Not Confer upon an AttorneyShareholder a Limitation on Personal Liability for
Attorney's Breach of Duty: Sanders, Bruin, Coil & Worley,
P.A. v. McKay Oil Corporation
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the passage of the New Mexico Professional Corporation Act of 1963,2
partnerships provided the most common means for association within the legal
community. 3 When a client had retained one member of a law partnership, the client
effectively retained each of the individual members of the firm with the result that
each partner would be held vicariously liable4 not only for his own malpractice, but
also for the tortious acts of the other members of the firm. With the passage of the
Professional Corporation Act, questions arose with regard to the liability of persons
within a professional corporation and how it differed from the liability of those
engaged in a partnership. In Sanders, Bruin, Coil, & Worley P.A. v. McKay Oil
Corporation,6 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that attorney-shareholders in a
law firm organized as a professional corporation are not shielded from personal
liability for the attorney's own negligence when acting within the attorney's
professional capacity.7 This Note describes the personal liability of shareholders of
a professional corporation for both professional and business obligations, examines
the rationale of Sanders, and explores the implications of that decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Roy McKay (McKay) filed a counterclaim against the law firm of Sanders, Bruin,
Coil & Worley, P.A. (the firm) as a corporation, and against each of the five
attorney-shareholders of the firm individually, for breach of contract and wrongful
termination after the firm withdrew from its representation of McKay six weeks

1. 123 N.M. 457, 943 P.2d 104 (1997).
2. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-6-1 to-13 (Repl. Pamp. 2001).
3. See Walter W. Steele, Jr., How Lawyers Protectthe Family Jewels... .The Invention of Limited Liability
Partnerships,39 S. TEx. L REv. 621,622 (1998).
4. Vicarious liability is the responsibility of one person, without any wrongful conduct of his
own, for the tort of another. Its modem justification is a policy which places such responsibility
upon the party best able to bear and distribute the risk. Vicarious liability is the responsibility
of A for the tort of B committed against C, where A himself has had no part in the tortious
conduct. Since A has been free from any negligence or any wrongful intent, it is a form of strict
liability. Its foundation, however, is still a tort on the part of B, and its effect is to make A liable
to the same extent as B. The most familiar illustration, of course, is the liability of a master for
the torts of his servant in the course of his employment.
WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OFTORTS § 62 (1941).
5. See George v. Caton, 93 N.M. 370, 375, 600 P.2d 822, 827 (Ct. App. 1979) (holding that "[pilaintiff
retained the firm of White and Caton. This was equivalent to retaining each member of the firm, although one
member of the firm had been consulted"); see also Bossert Corporation v. City of Norwalk, 253 A.2d 39 (Conn.
1968) (holding that the retaining of a law firm was equivalent to retaining each of its members even though only
one of the members of the firm may have been actually consulted).
6. 123 N.M. 457, 943 P.2d 104(1997).
7. Id. at 462,943 P.2d at 109. Other questions, such as whether a shareholder in a professional corporation
would be personally responsible for their fellow shareholder's professional liabilities and whether they would be
liable for the debts or contractual obligations of the corporation, have yet to be examined.
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before the firm was to represent him in a multi-million dollar arbitration.' Without
Damon Richards, the primary counsel for plaintiff, present, the other four attorneyshareholders held a meeting at which they each agreed to sever the attorney-client
relationship with McKay.9 In furtherance of this end, the firm sent a letter signed by
all five of the attorney-shareholders, including Damon Richards, that notified
McKay of his termination.'" Upon receipt of the termination letter, McKay retained
2
other counsel." This attorney successfully defended McKay in the arbitration. The
Sanders firm filed an action against McKay to collect3 unpaid attorneys fees for work
it had allegedly done before McKay's termination.1 McKay responded by filing a
counterclaim that presented his legal malpractice claims, seeking recovery from both
corporation and each of the five attorney-shareholders individuthe professional
14
ally.
The four attorney-shareholders who had decided to end the firm's representation
of McKay jointly filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the
motion on the ground that the termination was a "corporate act for which the
5
lawyers would not have individual liability."' McKay appealed the judgment of the
trial court, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals certified the case to the New
Mexico Supreme Court.' The supreme court held that summary judgment should
not have been granted and therefore reversed and remanded the case to the trial court
for hearing.
1I. BACKGROUND
7
Historically, lawyers associated in either general or limited partnerships.' The
Uniform Partnership Act defines a partnership as "an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."'" Each partner is jointly and
8. Id. at 458, 493 P.2d at 105. McKay filed this counterclaim after the firm brought an action seeking to
collect unpaid attorney's fees that had accrued prior to their withdrawal.
9. Id.
10. The letter, dated September 16, 1992, reads:
Dear Roy:
After careful consideration and much prayer, our firm has decided to immediately withdraw as
your attorneys on the McKay/Royale case, and to further terminate all business relationships
with you. Our overriding concern is the health and well-being of Damon Richards. Additionally,
we lack the necessary manpower to properly represent you.
We will immediately begin an orderly withdrawal from your cases. You can be assured of our
cooperation and assistance with future counsel.
We are grateful for your friendship and business thru the years.
Letter from Sanders firm to Roy McKay (Sept. 16, 1992) (on file with the NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEw).
The five attorney-shareholders, in their capacity as shareholders, signed the letter. There are facts, however, that
suggest Richards did not support the termination but was fearful that he would lose his job had he decided not to
sign the letter presented to him by his colleagues.
11.

Sanders, 123 N.M. at 458, 943 P.2d at 105.

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-14 (Repl. Pamp. 2001). The Supreme Court granted certification in the
instant case under section 34-5-14(C)(2), noting that this case presented issues of "substantial pubfic interest."
Sanders, 123 N.M. at 458, 943 P.2d at 105 (1997).
17. See Steele, supra note 3, at 621.
18. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(I).
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severally liable for the debts of the partnership incurred where "any partner is acting
in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his
co-partners."' 9
More recently, attorneys choosing to associate have been able to take advantage
of state statutes providing for the creation of limited liability partnerships. A limited
liability partnership is a "partnership formed by two or more persons.. .and having
one or more general partners and one or more limited partners."'2 In a limited
liability partnership, a limited partner is "not liable for the obligations of a limited
partnership unless he [or she] is a general partner or.. .participates in the control of
the business."2' Essentially, professional associates who choose not to have a voice
in the active management of the partnership can limit their liability for partnership
debts to their initial contribution to the partnership.22
Traditionally, the licensed professions were not allowed to incorporate. The
primary differences between partnerships and corporations are in the management
structure and the provisions regarding liability. In contrast to the general partnership,
the management of the corporation is centralized in a board of directors.23 An
attractive feature of the corporate form is that a shareholder of a corporation is not
personally liable for the "acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become
personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct."2 In addition to being
deprived of limited liability, professionals also were not entitled to certain tax
advantages such as tax-qualified pension plans that were available to corporations
and their employees.25
Professionals urged courts and state legislatures to allow for the association of
professionals within the structure of a corporation. Courts and state legislatures were
reluctant to allow professional corporations because they "may have the effect to
'
lower the standards of responsibility owed by attorneys to their clients."26
Nonetheless, all fifty states now permit all or certain of the learned professions to
practice as professional corporations or associations, though almost all have adopted
a "savings clause" 27 similar to that embodied in N.M. Statute Annotated section 536-8, which provides, in part, that "[t]he Professional Corporations Act...does not
modify the legal relationships, including confidential relationships, between a
person performing professional services and the client or patient who receives such
services.... "28 The New Mexico legislature, seeking to limit the personal liability of

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

UNIFORM PARTNERSFHP ACT § 13-15.
REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSIP ACT § 101 (7).
REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303(a).
See REVISED UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERsHIP AT § 17(1).
See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 8.01.
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 6.22.

25. For a comprehensive examination of the relation between the New Mexico Professional Corprtion Act
and the federal income tax laws prior to the passage of the "check-the-box" regulations, see generally Robert
Desiderio et aL, The New Mexico Professional Corporation,9 NAT. RESOURcES J. 591,591-610 (1969); see also
In re Rhode Island Bar Association, 263 A.2d 692 (R.I. 1970).
26. S. High Dev., Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe, & Cromley Co., L.P.A., 445 N.E.2d 1106, 1109 (Ohio 1983).
27.

See ALFREDCONARD ET AL., ENTERPRISEORGANIZATION: UNIVERSITY CASEBOOKSERIES (3d ed. 1982).

The five states that do not have a "savings clause" are Alabama, Colorado, Indiana, New York, and Rhode Island.
28. The Professional Corporations Act [53-6-1 to 53-6-13 NMSA 1978] does not modify the legal
relationships, including confidential relationships, between a person performing professional
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shareholders for purely business obligations, included within this section an
additional provision that provides that "the liability of shareholders shall be
otherwise limited as provided in the Business Corporation Act and as otherwise
provided by law." 29 This language strongly suggests that, with the exception set
forth in section 53-6-8, the liability protection afforded to shareholders of a
professional corporation is the same as that provided for under general business
liability for both the tortious and contractual misconduct
corporation law-limited
3°
of other members.
IV. RATIONALE OF THE SANDERS COURT
In Sanders, the New Mexico Supreme Court interpreted the New Mexico
3
Professional Corporation Act to provide that professional corporations supply no
own malpractice or obligations
protection from personal liability for an attorney's
32 The firm contended that the attorneyindividually incurred by breach of duty.
shareholders should not be found personally liable because the termination of
McKay was an act of the corporate body rather than that of any individual attorneyin part based on an examination into
shareholder.33 The court rejected this argument,
34
the origins of the professional corporation.
In response to concerns that incorporation may possibly detract from the
professional accountability of attorneys, many jurisdictions passed legislation
containing a "savings" provision similar to that found in the Professional
35
Corporation Act in New Mexico. This clause provides that incorporation does not
modify the legal relationships between a person performing professional services
3
and the client who receives such services " and ensures that the lawyer who is guilty
of negligence will be personally liable to the client.
Courts, however, frequently disagreed as to shareholder or member liabilities for
37
contractual and pure business obligations. Some courts held that just as officers
and employees of corporations would not be held personally liable for business or
contractual decisions, so too attorney-shareholders associated in a professional

services and the client or patient who receives such services; but the liability of shareholders
shall be otherwise limited as provided in the Business Corporation Act [53-11-1 to 53-18-12
NMSA 1978] and as otherwise provided by law.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-6-8 (Repl. Pamp. 2001) (bracketed material in original).
29. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-6-8 (Repl. Pamp. 2001).
30. See generally N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-1 to -18-12 (Repl. Pamp. 2001).
31. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
P.2d 104, 108
32. See Sanders, Bruin,Coil & Worley, P.A. v. McKay Oil Corp., 123 N.M. 457, 461, 943
(1997).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-6-8 (Repl. Pamp. 2001).
& Bloom
37. See Sanders, 123 N.M. at 461, 943 P.2d at 108; We're Associates. Co. v. Cohen, Stracher
of
shareholder
individual
an
of
liability
personal
the
that
(holding
1984)
P.C., 478 N.Y.S.2d 670 (N.Y. App. Div.
services on
a professional corporation is limited to liability arising out of misconduct while rendering professional
445 N.E.2d 1106,
behalf of the corporation); but see S. High Dev., Ltd.v. Weiner, lippe & Cromley Co., LP.A.,
are personally
corporation
a
professional
of
attorney-shareholders
that
(providing
curiam)
(per
1108 (Ohio 1983)
are personally
association
professional
legal
a
of
shareholders
individual
liable for rents due under a lease because
liable for the debts of that association).
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corporation were not to be liable for business conduct that was not classified as
professional.3 s9 Other courts saw no need to extend such protection to professional
3
corporations.
The Sanders court found it unnecessary to rule on this question because it
concluded that the withdrawal from representation was not a mere business decision.
Rather, the court noted that withdrawal from representation is governed by Rule 161 16(B) of the New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct' and determined that the
decision to terminate the attorney-client relationship was "well within the scope of
legal representation."' Accordingly, the court concluded that the individual
attorney-shareholders who participated in the decision to terminate McKay would
not be permitted to use their position within the professional corporation as a shield
from individual liability for their own improper behavior or malpractice.4 2 The court
therefore held that the attorney-shareholders had acted in their professional capacity
as attorneys when deciding to terminate McKay and, in so doing, each would be
personally responsible to McKay if their conduct in terminating him constituted a
breach of duty.43 The court determined that the question as to whether each
attorney's actions rose to the level of malpractice remained." Consequently, the
court reversed the order granting summary judgment and remanded the case for a
determination on this issue.45
V. ANALYSIS
The Sanders case highlights the ubiquitous tension in New Mexico between the
courts and the state legislature, particularly with regard to a subject that has
traditionally been governed by the New Mexico Supreme Court-the
responsibilities of attorneys. In this case, the court appears to accept the legislative
intrusion into their realm, affording professionals associated within professional
corporations the limited liability granted to them by the state legislature for both
professional misdeeds in which they do not participate and for business decisions,
while preserving an attorney-shareholder's liability for his own malpractice.

38. See We're Associates Co. v. Cohen, Stracher & Bloom, P.C., 478 N.Y.S.2d 670 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
39. See S. High Dev., 445 N.E.2d at 1108.
40. Rule 16-116(B) NMRA 1997 provides in pertinent part that
a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without
material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if: (5) the representation will result in an
unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the
client; or (6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
This provision is qualified by 16-116(D), which provides in part:
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable
to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled
and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.
41. Sanders, 123 N.M. at 459, 943 P.2dat 106.
42. Id. at 460,943 P.2d at 107.
43. See id. at 463, 943 P.2d at 110.
44. See id. at 462, 943 P.2d at 109.
45. See id. at 463, 943 P.2d at I10.
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A. An Attorney-Shareholder'sLiability within a New Mexico Professional
Corporationfor One's Own Malpracticeand that of the OtherAttorneyShareholders.
The New Mexico Professional Corporation Act provides that "[tihe Professional
Corporation Act... does not modify the legal relationships, including confidential
relationships, between a person performing professional services and the client or
patient who receives such services; but the liability of shareholders shall be
otherwise limited as provided in the Business Corporation Act... and as otherwise
provided by law."4" The statute, as well as the Sanders court holding, requires that
a professional in a professional corporation continue to be liable for the
professional's own misdeeds, as he would have been had he been a partner or
limited partner. In addition, the corporation is vicariously liable for the professional
liabilities of an attorney arising within the scope of the attorney's work in the
professional corporation.4 7 Therefore, the Sanderscourt concluded that "professional
corporate status was not intended to confer, nor does it confer, upon an attorneyshareholder a limitation on liability for the attorney's own improper behavior or
malpractice. ' 48 Although an attorney-shareholder will continue to be liable for his
own tortious conduct, the court strongly suggests that he would not be vicariously
liable for the misdeeds of other shareholders in which he does not participate.
In Sanders, the court, presumably recognizing that unlimited liability is not
necessary to assure quality services by a professional within a professional
corporation, noted in dictum49 that a "professional corporation50 will provide limited
protection for the misdeeds of fellow attorney-shareholders." Moreover, the court
explicitly rejected the application of traditional partnership law precepts to a
professional corporation. 5' Such a determination with regard 52to a limitation on
liability is not only well supported by a number of jurisdictions and the American
Bar Association so long as such restrictions on liability are made apparent to the

46.
47.
48.
49.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-6-8 (Repl. Pamp. 2001).
We're Associates Co. v. Cohen, Stracher & Bloom, P.C., 478 N.Y.S.2d 670, 674 (N.Y. 1984).
Sanders, 123 N.M. at 460. 943 P.2d at 107.
A statement, remark, or observation. The word is generally used as an abbreviated form of
obiter dictum, "a remark by the way," that is, an observation or remark made by a judge in
pronouncing an opinion upon a cause, concerning some rule, principle, or application of law, or
the solution of a question suggested by the case at bar, but not necessarily involved in the case
or essential to its determination; any statement of the law enunciated by the court merely by way
of illustration, argument, analogy, or suggestion. Statements and comments in an opinion
concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to
determination of the case in hand are obiter dicta, and lack the force of an adjudication. Dicta

are opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and
made without argument, or full consideration of the point, are not the professed deliberate
determinations of the judge himself.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 454 (6th ed. 1990).
50. Sanders, 123 N.M. at 463, 943 P.2d at 110.

51. See id. at 460, 943 P.2d at 107.
52. See ALA. CODE § 10-4-390 (1985); ALASKA STAT. § 10.45.140 (Michie 1962); HAW. REV. STAT. § 416-

153 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496C.9 (West 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 274.055 (Baldwin 1981); LA. REV.

STAT. ANN. § 12:807 (West 1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 13, § 708 (West 1964); MINN. REV. STAT. § 319A.10

(West 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 89.060 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-6-8 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-31-09
(1985); RI. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.1-1 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-51-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 47-13A-7 (Michie 1983); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 1528e(16) (Vernon 1980).
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client,53 but also finds support in the two jurisdictions with Professional Corporation
Acts most similar to New Mexico's.
The Rhode Island Professional Corporation Act provides that "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this chapter, all provisions of the general corporation law,
including the Rhode Island Business Corporation Act... applicable to domestic
business corporations are applicable to corporations organized under this chapter."'
Even though the Rhode Island Act does not contain a clause that provides that "It] he
Professional Corporation Act.. .does not modify the legal relationships, including
confidential relationships, between a person performing professional services and
the client or patient who receives such services,"" as is found in the New Mexico
Act, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has interpreted its Act to provide a grant of
non-liability to those attorney-shareholders who do not participate in the wrongful
act.56 Additional support for maintaining attorney-shareholders' liability for their
own misdeeds while limiting their liability for the misdeeds of fellow attorneymay be found in a close reading of the Iowa Professional Corporation
shareholders
57

Act,

The New Mexico Supreme Court was correct, and well supported, in its
determination that professional corporate status will not shield an attorneyshareholder from his own malpractice though such status does offer limited
protection from the malpractice of his fellow attorney-shareholders in which he does
not participate. However, the court's statement that an attorney-shareholder will be
shielded from liability for the malpractice of a fellow attorney-shareholder in a
professional corporation was not essential to the determination of the case and thus
lacks the weight given to a formal holding.5"

53. Attorneys may practice in corporate form provided that the following safeguards are followed:
(1) The lawyer rendering the legal services to the client must be personally responsible to the
client; (2) Restrictions on liability as to other lawyers in the organization must be made apparent
to the client; (3) None of the stockholders may be non-lawyers, or if stock falls into the hands
of laymen, provision must be made for transfer back to lawyers; (4) There must be no profitsharing plans including employees who are non-lawyers; and (5) No layman may be permitted
to participate in the management of the firm.
ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 303 (1961).
54. R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-5.1-1 (1985).
55. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-6-8 (Repl. Pamp. 2001).
56. See In re Rhode Island Bar Association, 263 A.2d 692 (R.I. 1970).
57. This chapter does not modify any law applicable to the relationship between an individual
practicing a profession and a person receiving professional services, including, but not limited
to, any liability arising out of such practice and any law respecting privileged communications.
This chapter does not modify or affect the ethical standards or standards of conduct of any
profession, including, but not limited to, any standards prohibiting or limiting the practice of the
profession by a corporation or prohibiting or limiting the practice of two or more professions in
combination. AD such standards shall apply to the shareholders, directors, officers, employees,
and agents through whom a professional corporation practices any profession in this state, to the
same extent that the standards apply to an individual practitioner. Unless otherwise provided in
the articles of incorporation, the liability of the shareholders of a professional corporation, as
shareholders, shall be limited in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of a
corporation organized under the Iowa Business Corporation Act.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 496C.9 (West 1985).
58. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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B. Classifying a Breach as Within or Outside the Scope of ProfessionalServices
The Sanders court appears to have adopted a means by which to classify a breach
as being within, or outside of, the scope of professional services comparable to a test
adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. To find that a breach may properly be
classified as professional in nature, the Wisconsin court requires that the breach
"both... relate to professional services and that the breach was a negligent or
59
wrongful act committed in the rendition of those professional services." The
it
since
services
Sanders court found that the firm's breach related to professional
because
and
was governed by Rule 11-616(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct
the breach occurred while rendering professional services.' In addition, public
policy supports the imposition of a duty because McKay had reason to believe that
his case would be handled in a professional manner and would not be abandoned six
weeks before a multi-million dollar arbitration. 6 This rule "preserves the personal
responsibility of a professional for services within his expertise and which the client
has every right to expect will be performed in a professional manner. '62 Finally, this
"test" will enhance judicial efficiency and will lead to greater consistency and
uniformity as the New Mexico courts now have some indication of what factors to
consider when presented with a case that requires a determination of whether a
breach is professional or nonprofessional in nature.
C. An Attorney-Shareholder'sLiability within a New Mexico Professional
Corporationfor Obligationsof a Purely Business Nature
The Sanders court noted in dictum that "professional corporate status was not
intended to confer, nor does it confer, upon an attorney-shareholder a limitation on
liability for the attorney's own improper behavior or malpractice, even in the context
of corporate activities and decisions."63 Although at first glance this appears to be
an erosion of the legislative grant of limited liability to shareholders who practice
in professional corporations, upon closer examination it becomes apparent that it is
not.
The New Mexico Professional Corporation Act provides that the liability of the
shareholders of a professional corporation is limited in the same manner and to the
same extent as in the case of a corporation organized under the New Mexico
Business Corporation Act.6 Section 53-11-25 of the New Mexico Business
Corporation Act provides that "[a] holder of or subscriber to shares of a corporation
shall be under no obligation to the corporation or its creditors with respect to the
shares other than the obligation to pay to the corporation the full consideration for
which the shares were issued or to be issued. 65 This means that a shareholder's

59. Herkert v. Stauber, 317 N.W.2d 834, 845 (Wis. 1982).
60. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
61. In New Mexico, in addition to the question of foreseeability, the court must determine whether public
policy supports the imposition of a duty by considering "legal precedent, statutes, and other principles comprising
the law." Calkins v. Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 62, 792 P.2d 36, 39 (1990).
62. Heckert, 317 N.W.2d at 845.
63. Sanders, Bruin, Col & Worley, P.A. v. McKay Oil Corp., 123 N.M. 457,460, 943 P.2d 104, 107 (1997).
64. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-6-8 (Repl. Pamp. 2001).
65. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-25(A) (Repl. Pamp. 2001).
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liability is limited "to the amount he has contributed to the corporation." Two
cases, We're Associates Company v. Cohen, Stracher & Bloom, P. C. 67 and Morrow
v. Cooper,68 examine why, aside from a clear legislative directive, the court should
extend the same limitation on liability to shareholders of a professional corporation
as is enjoyed by shareholders of a business corporation and should define the
boundaries of this legislative grant of limited liability.
In We're Associates, the New York court explained why a shareholder of a
professional corporation is entitled to the same limitation on liability as a
shareholder in a business corporation. The court here was presented with the issue
of whether shareholders of a professional corporation are personally liable for rents
due under a lease executed solely in the name of the corporation. 69 The court
reasoned that since a major characteristic of a general corporation is its provisions
for limited liability and since "professional corporations organized under those
statutes would have to exhibit the major characteristics of a general corporation,"
the legislature must have intended that a shareholder's liability for contractual
obligations for corporate activities and decisions within a professional corporation
be limited to the assets of the corporation.7" Therefore, the court, finding "no basis
for concluding that attorneys who practice in a professional corporation have some
exceptional legal obligation over and above that of other professionals simply by
virtue of their particular profession," held that shareholders of a professional
corporation should "enjoy the same benefits of limited liability afforded to
shareholders of any other form of corporation."71 This grant of limited liability,
however, may be subject to the same exceptions that affect shareholders in business
corporations.
In Morrow v. Cooper,72 the New Mexico Court of Appeals considered when a
shareholder of a professional corporation might be personally liable for a corporate
act. In Morrow, the court examined an individual judgment entered against a
shareholder of a professional corporation in favor of the other shareholders
predicated "solely upon a failure of the corporation to properly value the stock of
the corporation."73 The court cited with approval Scott v. AZL Resources, Inc.,74 a
case in which the New Mexico Supreme Court noted that "[olnly under special
circumstances will the courts disregard the corporate entity to pierce the corporate
veil holding individual shareholders.., liable. This is done where the corporation was
set up for fraudulent purposes or where to recognize the corporation would result in
injustice., 75 Speaking of the liability of a shareholder in a professional corporation
for the general business debts of the corporation, the court declared that "[t]o hold
an individual liable for corporate debts, the complaining party must establish that

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Morrow v. Cooper, 113 N.M. 246, 249, 824 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Ct. App. 1991).
478 N.Y.S.2d 670 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
113 N.M. 246, 824 P.2d 1048 (Ct. App. 1991).
See We're Associates, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
Id. at 672-73.
Id.
at 675.
113 N.M. 246, 824 P.2d 1048 (Ct. App. 1991).
Id. at 249, 824 P.2d at 1051.
107 N.M. 118, 753 P.2d 897 (1988).
Id. at 121, 753 P.2d at 900.
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76
the corporation should not be recognized as a matter of law. The Morrow Court,
for a
finding that the professional corporation in question had not been established
liability. 77
fraudulent purpose, reversed on the issue of Cooper's individual
Morrow demonstrates that a shareholder usually is only personally responsible
for the general debts of a corporation when the corporate veil can be pierced.
Morrow acknowledged a second situation, however, in which the shareholder could
be held liable: "The Professional Corporation Act does not preclude a corporate
'7
officer or employee from being sued individually for his wrongful acts. 1 It is clear,
then, that a shareholder, whether practicing within a professional corporation or
simply a shareholder or employee of a general corporation, is not entirely insulated
from personal liability for general corporate debts. Rather, as demonstrated by
Morrow, a shareholder in a professional corporation may be exposed to personal
liability upon a showing that the professional corporation had been established for
a fraudulent purpose and may also expose himself to personal liability for his own
wrongful acts. Thus, the Sanders court correctly asserted that attorney-shareholders
will be liable for their own misdeeds within the context of corporate activities and
decisions, provided that by use of the phrase "improper behavior" the court meant
that the attorney-shareholder must have created the corporation for an improper
purpose or personally committed wrongful acts.
There is question, however, as to whether the court will analyze the actions of the
attorney-shareholders merely as shareholders, or whether the attorney-shareholders'
participation in the management of the corporation will lead the court to analyze
their liability, alternatively, in the role of officers, when presented with a situation
where the improper conduct is classified as outside of the scope of professional
services.79
Just as shareholders of a professional corporation are subject to the same
exceptions to liability as shareholders of a business corporation, so too are directors
of a professional association to be similarly subject to the same exceptions to
liability as directors of a business corporation. Thus, in Stinson v. Berry, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals recognized that directors of a corporation are liable to
third persons when they engage in misconduct.8 0 In that case, the estate brought an
action against defendant Yucca Feeds, Inc., a corporation, and John Berry, the
president and manager of the corporation, after the decedent was fatally injured
while engaged in the performance of services for the corporation. The court noted
that "[d]irectors are liable to third persons injured by their own tortious conduct
regardless of whether they acted on behalf of the corporation and regardless of
whether the corporation is also liable."'" Thus, "if corporate directors engage in
tortious conduct, even though acting within the scope of their corporate duties, they

76. Morrow, 113 N.M. 246, 249, 824 P.2d at 1051.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. "The law imposes the business management of a corporation on its directors." 18B AM. JuR. 2d
Corporations§ 1703 (1985).
80. 123 N.M. 482, 943 P.2d 129 (Ct. App. 1997).
81. Id. at 487, 943 P.2d at 134.
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can be personally liable for the injuries suffered as a result of that conduct."82 The
court determined that since "[d]irector status.. .neither immunizes a person from
individual liability nor subjects him or her to vicarious liability," the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment in favor of John Berry on the ground that he was
acting within the scope of his corporate duties.83
The Stinson court additionally set out basic propositions of corporation law that
apply to the Sanders case. First, the court noted that since "a corporation is a legal
entity, separate from its shareholders, directors, and officers," the "shareholders,
directors, and officers are not personally liable for the acts and obligations of the
corporation."84 Moreover, the court stated that "directors cannot be held vicariously
liable for the corporation's torts merely by virtue of the office they hold."85 The
court, however, reiterated that "if an officer or director directs or actively
participates in the commission of the tortious act of the corporation, he will be
liable, along with the corporation." 6 Therefore, "if the officer or director directed,
controlled, approved or ratified the activity that87created liability in tort to a third
person, he or she can be held personally liable.
It is possible to view the decision of the four shareholders to terminate McKay
as an act of the directors of the corporation.88 Even if the court analyzed the liability
of the four shareholders in Sanders in the role of directors of the professional
corporation, the outcome would still be the same-an attorney-shareholder, where
acting as a corporate director, will not be personally liable for a general corporate
debt, absent some showing of "improper behavior" that the director engaged in,
approved of, or assented to. Thus, the Sanders court's statement that attorneyshareholders would be personally liable for their own improper behavior in the
context of corporate activities and decisions is in accord with prior New Mexico
cases and both the Professional Corporation and Business Corporation Acts.
Finally, the Sanderscourt's declaration that an attorney-shareholder will be liable
for their "own improper behavior" (emphasis added) for corporate activities and
decisions strongly suggests that an attorney-shareholder in a professional
corporation will not be vicariously liable for the corporate misdeeds of the other
attorney-shareholders in which they do not participate.89 As opposed to a
professional partnership where "each partner is jointly and severally liable for all of
the obligations of the partnership-both contractual and those arising from the acts
or omissions of a member of a partnership,"" a professional corporation will limit
the personal liability of an attorney-shareholder for corporate debts "to the amount
he has contributed to the corporation" and will insulate the personal assets of the
individual attorney-shareholder so long as they do not assent to, or participate in, the

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 486, 943 P.2d at 133.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ld.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
Sanders, Bruin, Coil & Worley, P.A. v. McKay Oil Corp., 123 N.M. 457,460,943 P.2d 104, 107 (1997).
We're Associates Co. v. Cohen, Stracher & Bloom, P.C., 478 N.Y.S.2d 670,674 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
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"improper behavior" that has exposed the other attorney-shareholder to personal
liability.9
Thus, it was the attorney-shareholders' unanimous decision to terminate McKay's
representation that exposed them to liability. Possibly, if any one of the four
attorney-shareholders dissented from the decision, that shareholder may not have
been liable. Section 53-11-35(C) of the New Mexico Business Corporation Act sets
forth the applicable procedure for dissenting to an act of the board of directors:
A director of a-corporation who is present at a meeting of its board of directors
at which action on any corporate matter is taken shall be presumed to have
assented to the action taken unless the director shall file written dissent in the
minutes of the meeting or unless the director shall file written dissent to such
action with.the secretary of the meeting before the adjournment thereof or shall
forward such dissent by registered mail to the secretary of the corporation
right to dissent shall not
immediately after the adjournment of the meeting. Such
apply to a director who voted in favor of such action.92
As noted by the Morrow court in the context of corporate activities, "although the
Professional Corporation Act does not preclude a corporate officer or employee
from being sued individually for his wrongful acts, and he can also make the
corporation liable for his wrongful acts, the other professional shareholders, who are
93
also the other professional employees, cannot be held liable." Therefore, just as
professional corporate status may shield attorney-shareholders from vicarious
liability for the professional misconduct of a fellow attorney-shareholder, such status
may similarly insulate them from the corporate misdeeds of their fellow attorneyshareholders or directors so long as they do not commit improper acts.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
After the Sanders case, an attorney-shareholder in a professional corporation will
continue to be liable for his own malpractice. Sanders also suggests that the
professional corporation statute provides a shield for an attorney-shareholder from
vicarious liability for a fellow attorney-shareholders' malpractice, though the issue
has yet to be necessarily determined. Thus, it appears as though an attorneyshareholder does not have to worry about his colleague's competence as he did
when he entered a partnership. For the time being, it would be prudent, if one seeks
to limit one's liability with regard to one's fellow attorney-shareholders'
malpractice, to make such restrictions on liability apparent to the professional
corporation's client. 94
91. Morrow v. Cooper, 113 N.M. 246, 249, 824 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Ct. App. 1991). See In re Rhode Island
Bar Association, 263 A.2d 692, 697 (R.I. 1970) (noting that "[t]he only substantial change made by the act from
practice of law in partnership form is that... the lawyer-shareholders who do not participate in the rendering of the
services out of which an actionable wrong arises will be free from personal liability and will not be responsible for
the debts of the corporation").
92. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(C) (Repl. Pamp. 2001).
93. Morrow, 113 N.M. at 249, 824 P.2d at 1051.
94. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Canon 33 of the American Bar Association's Canons of
Professional Ethics provides that in the "selection and use of a firm name, no false, misleading, assumed or trade
name should be used." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 33 (1928). Formal Opinion 303 notes that
the "name under which a group of lawyers practices would be misleading if it failed to reveal any restrictions on
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In addition, Sanders provides that an attorney-shareholder will enjoy the same
limitation on liability in the context of corporate activities and decisions as would
a shareholder of a general corporation. This, however, is not a blanket shield from
all liability for activities within the corporate context.95 Attorney-shareholders will
continue to be personally liable for their own improper behavior within the corporate
realm, while being shielded from personal liability for misdeeds within the business
context in which they do not partake.96
VII. CONCLUSION
In Sanders, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that attorney-shareholders in
a law firm organized as a professional corporation would not be shielded from
individual liability for the attorneys' own negligence when acting within their
professional capacity. In so doing, the court has attempted to ensure that attorneys,
and other professionals, would not be able to escape responsibility for their
misdeeds simply by choosing a more favorable means of association. The court
suggested that it would limit an attorney-shareholder's liability to his own
"malpractice" for professional misdeeds and his "own improper behavior" within
"the context of corporate activities and decisions." 97 Finally, the case pronounces a
logical and workable standard for determining whether a decision is professional in
nature. Although Sanders leaves certain central questions as to the liability of
shareholders of professional corporations unanswered, it sends a clear message that
this means of association was not intended to confer, nor does it confer, a limitation
on liability for an attorney's own malpractice.
DAVID M. PATO

the responsibility of the individual lawyers for the legal services rendered." ABA Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Formal
Op. 303 (1961). However, Formal Opinion 303 fails to address the precise manner by which an attorney can make
such restrictions apparent to his client.
95. Recall that the trial court granted summary judgment to the individual attorney-shareholders after
classifying the breach as a corporate activity for which the attorney-shareholders would not be held personally liable
without further discussion of whether the breach constituted improper conduct.
96. See Sanders, Bruin, Coil & Worley, P.A. v. McKay Oil Corp., 123 N.M. 457, 460, 943 P.2d 104, 107
(1997).
97. Id.

